

Arizona Utility Investors Association

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ORIGINAL



BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION

Marc Spitzer Chairman William A. Mundell Commissioner Mike Gleason Commissioner Jeff Hatch-Miller Commissioner Kristin Mayes Commissioner

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE FAIR VALUE OF THE UTILITY PROPERTY FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES, TO FIX A JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN THEREON, TO APPROVE RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP SUCH RETURN, AND FOR APPROVAL OF PURCHASED POWER CONTRACT.

DOCKET NO. E-01345A-03-0437

> Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED

> > SEP 2 7 2004

NOTICE OF FILING TESTIMONY

DOCKETED BY

Pursuant to the amended procedural order in this matter dated August 20, 2004, the ARIZONA UTILITY INVESTORS ASSOCIATION (AUIA) hereby submits the initial testimony of Walter W. Meek.

Respectfully submitted, this 27th day of September, 2004.

Walter W. Meek, President

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

An original and 13 copies of the referenced testimony filed this 27th day of September, 2004, with:

Docket Control Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007

Copies of the referenced testimony hand delivered this 27th day of September, 2004, to:

Mark Spitzer, Chairman
Philip Dion, Executive Assistant
William A. Mundell, Commissioner
Adam Stafford, Executive Assistant
Jeff Hatch-Miller, Commissioner
Dean Miller, Executive Assistant
Mike Gleason, Commissioner
Jodi Jerich, Executive Assistant
Kristin Mayes, Commissioner
Garry D. Hays, Executive Assistant
Christopher Kempley, Esq., Legal Division
Lyn Farmer, Esq., Hearing Division
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A copy of the referenced testimony was mailed this 27th day of September, 2004, to:

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Parties of Record

WALTER W. MEEK

DOCKET NO. E-01345A-03-0437

SETTLEMENT TESTIMONY OF WALTER W. MEEK

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1		SETTLEMENT TESTIMONY OF WALTER W. MEEK
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3	I.	Introduction, Qualifications & Purpose of Testimony
4	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
5	A.	My name is Walter W. Meek. My business address is 2100 North Central
6		Avenue, Suite 210, Phoenix, Arizona 85004.
7	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?
8	A.	I am the president of the Arizona Utility Investors Association ("AUIA"), a
9		non-profit organization formed to represent the interests of equity owners
10		and bondholders who are invested in utility companies that are based in or
11		do business in the State of Arizona.
12	Q.	DOES AUIA'S MEMBERSHIP INCLUDE SHAREHOLDERS WHO HAVE
13		EQUITY INTERESTS IN ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)?
14	A.	Yes. APS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation
15		(PWCC). AUIA's largest membership block consists of common stockholders
16		in PWCC.
17	Q.	ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS PROCEEDING?
18	A.	On behalf of AUIA, an intervenor in this proceeding.
19	Q.	WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN
20		REGULATORY MATTERS AT THIS COMMISSION?
21	A.	I represent the largest cross-section of utility stockholders in the State of
22		Arizona and I have been involved with the utility business in Arizona for 28
23		years. I have participated in dozens of Commission dockets on behalf of
24		AUIA and testified in numerous proceedings. My testimony has covered
25		topics including rate of return issues, stranded costs, disposition of regulatory

- assets, AFUDC, inclusion of CWIP in rate base and the impact of regulatory
- 2 decisions on analyst and investor expectations.

3 Q. DO YOU TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS?

- 4 A. Not really. I will attempt to bring a "real world" investor perspective to some
- of the financial and regulatory issues raised in the rate case.

6 Q. HAVE YOU FILED TESTIMONY PREVIOUSLY IN THIS DOCKET?

- 7 A. Yes. AUIA filed rebuttal testimony on March 30, 2004.
- 8 Q. ARE YOU WITHDRAWING THAT TESTIMONY?
- 9 A. No. I am unsure of the appropriate procedure, but AUIA requests that its
- rebuttal testimony be made part of the permanent record in this case.
- 11 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY TODAY?
- 12 A. I am testifying in support of the proposed settlement agreement in the APS
- rate proceeding.
- 14 Q. IS AUIA A SIGNATORY TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT?
- 15 A. Yes. I have signed the agreement on behalf of AUIA.
- 16 II. Reasons for Supporting the Settlement
- 17 Q. IN GENERAL, WHY DOES AUIA SUPPORT THE SETTLEMENT?
- 18 A. I think there are three main reasons. First and foremost, the proposed
- settlement resolves some issues that are of grave concern to the financial
- 20 community. Resolution of those issues signals to financial analysts and rating
- 21 agencies that APS has a road map and a set of ground rules for conducting
- 22 its business in future years. Conversely, if these issues aren't resolved
- 23 equitably, the financial community may conclude that APS faces an
- 24 unacceptable level of regulatory and financial risk going forward.
- 25 Q. WHAT ARE THE KEY ISSUES?

1 A. I will discuss them in greater detail further on, but the key issues are: 1) a 2 revenue stream that provides an opportunity for the company to earn a 3 reasonable return on its asset base; 2) inclusion in rate base of its separated 4 generating units that are now owned by Pinnacle West Energy Corporation 5 (PWEC); 3) adoption of a purchased power and fuel adjustment mechanism 6 that would shield the company and its customers from fluctuating gas prices; 7 and 4) clarification of the means by which APS can meet the growing power 8 supply needs of its customers.

9 Q. WHAT IS YOUR SECOND REASON FOR SUPPORTING THE 10 SETTLEMENT?

11 Because it is fair to ratepayers, shareholders and all of the 22 stakeholders Α. 12 who have signed the settlement agreement. In the five months of 13 negotiations that produced this agreement, every participant experienced 14 both gains and losses compared to its initial litigation position. As a result of 15 this give and take, the interests of all stakeholders are fairly balanced in the 16 agreement. As a further result, the agreement is also very intricate and could 17 come apart if provisions that are important to various parties are altered 18 significantly.

19 Q. IS THAT A SUGGESTION THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD 20 RUBBER-STAMP THE AGREEMENT?

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Absolutely not. The Commission should examine the proposed settlement very carefully. When it does, I believe it will find that the broad interests of its constituencies are well served by the agreement. There are times, however, when the Commission seems beset by the need to put its stamp on ordering documents. It's human nature at work and I am only suggesting

1 that the Commission exercise extraordinary caution in this instance.

2 Q. YOUR THIRD REASON FOR SUPPORTING THE SETTLEMENT?

Because it would avoid extensive litigation on two fronts, the first being the completion of the rate case. I'm not talking about merely avoiding some inconvenience or even the appalling cost of a fully litigated case. Given the number and breadth of issues in this proceeding, it could take many months to complete. We have nearly 30 parties and the first two rounds of testimony produced more than 40 witnesses. I believe we could spend three months hearing this case and another four to five months arriving at a final Commission decision in mid-2005. During that time, the financial community surely would penalize the company for continued delays and uncertainty.

Q. WHAT IS THE SECOND LITIGATION FRONT?

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Under the terms of this agreement, APS will dismiss all of its appeals and litigation arising from the Commission's Track A decision (No. 65154) and the 1999 settlement agreement (No. 61973). Likewise, the Commission will terminate the Preliminary Inquiry ordered in the APS financing decision (No. 65796). It should be recalled that APS and Commission Staff some time ago sidestepped a legal showdown over the APS litigation by agreeing in a Statement of Principles to include the underlying issues in this rate case. Without a negotiated settlement, it is hard to envision a rate case result that would absolve APS from its fiduciary responsibility to seek redress on some issues, including a breach of contract claim against the Commission. In that circumstance, both the company and the Commission would be sentenced to lingering uncertainty and lack of direction.

As AUIA noted in its rebuttal testimony, the Commission is also

1	confronted by an Arizona Court of Appeals decision that invalidated major
2	sections of the Commission's retail competition rules. Absent a reversal on
3	appeal, the Commission, at some point, will have to revisit the rules. A
4	continuation of the APS litigation would complicate these issues further.

Q. FROM AN INVESTOR'S VIEWPOINT, IS THERE AN OVERRIDING BENEFIT TO THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT?

- 7 A. AUIA is not fixated on the revenue or rate of return components of the 8 agreement, although they are important elements. For perspective, let me 9 note that the financial community reacted in horror to the Staff's direct case in 10 large part because they viewed Staff's position as extreme and thought it 11 signaled a dysfunctional relationship between APS and the Commission. In 12 my view, an overriding benefit of the proposed settlement is that it portends 13 a more rational and stable regulatory environment and a new climate of 14 certainty for APS.
- 15 III. Key Issues Resolved By the Settlement Agreement
- 16 Q. YOU CITED FOUR KEY ISSUES THAT ARE RESOLVED IN THE
 17 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THEM?
- 18 A. Yes. I will discuss each of them separately.
- 19 Revenue Increase and Rate of Return (ROE)
- 20 Q. WHAT DOES THE AGREEMENT PROVIDE WITH REGARD TO
 21 INCREASED REVENUES AND RETURN ON EQUITY?
- A. The settlement agreement calls for an overall increase of \$75.5 million above test year revenues, a nominal increase of 4.2 percent. In fact, that amount includes \$9 million for demand side management, which does not contribute to net operating income, so the real increase is \$66.5 million, an improvement

of 3.7 percent over test year revenue. The agreement also provides for a rate of return on common equity (ROE) of 10.25 percent.

3 Q. HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE ROE PROVISION?

A. It represents a classic compromise, since it is exactly midway between the company's request of 11.5 percent and the Staff's initial recommendation of 9 percent. However, it is at the low end of returns that have been authorized in other jurisdictions in 2004, which have ranged as high as 12 percent and have averaged about 10.6 percent. I think the financial markets will view it as anemic but acceptable.

10 Q. HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE RECOMMENDED REVENUE

11 INCREASE?

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A. Again, the result is a product of negotiation and is linked to other issues, including the rate-basing of the PWEC units, the APS self-build moratorium and the company's future competitive acquisition of power supplies.

On a cash basis, the revenue increase is more than \$100 million less than the company requested. However, the resulting revenue stream and its earnings potential should allow Pinnacle West to continue its progressive dividend policy and that is very important to investors.

Beyond that, the best measure of the revenue requirement is the reaction of the financial analysts and rating agencies, which influence the company's ability to access the capital markets on reasonable terms.

22 Q. HAS THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY REACTED TO THE PROPOSED

23 SETTLEMENT?

24 A. Yes. Both the securities analysts and the rating agencies have responded in 25 their own ways. I would characterize the response as a mixed bag. On one hand, the analysts view the resolution of the major issues covered by the settlement agreement as a positive development, indicative of an improved regulatory environment for APS. The key issues they cited included rate-basing the PWEC units and adopting a fuel and purchased power adjustment mechanism (PSA). On the other hand, many analysts were disappointed with the amount of the revenue increase and its contribution to projected earnings.

Some analysts expressed concern that earnings imputed from the settlement agreement are somewhat dependent on accounting treatments, such as depreciation lives, rather than cash generation.

Here are some representative responses from securities analysts, all dated August 19, 2004:

- Lehman Brothers asserted that "the proposed settlement is a favorable outcome for the company (especially considering staff original testimony), [but] we would have preferred more cash increases as opposed to depreciation life adjustments which give up cash."
- Morgan Stanley said the settlement represents "a supportive regulatory action for PNW. But in such a fast growth territory, PNW needs [a] regulatory regime that will allow timely recovery of infrastructure investments."
- Merrill Lynch opined that increased regulatory certainty and the Company's customer growth could merit a premium in its stock rating, "but the rate case settlement initially looks to have fallen somewhat short in terms of earnings power."

All of the eight analyst reports I have reviewed since the settlement

agreement was announced have adopted a neutral or hold position on Pinnacle West stock. None has made a buy recommendation. That could change for the better if the settlement agreement is approved largely intact. I think the prevailing mood in the investment community is cautious optimism.

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The credit rating agencies seem to be in about the same place. All three -- Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Investment Ratings -- have maintained negative outlooks on APS.

In an August 20 report, S&P said the settlement agreement was "constructive from a business risk perspective," but added that it would do "little to strengthen the utility's financial profile." S&P also asserted that the proposed rate increase "will not likely inject sufficient incremental revenue into the company to shore up a financial condition that is somewhat pressured at the current rating level."

S&P also pointed to the rate-basing of 1,790 MW of PWEC generation and the adoption of a fuel and purchased power adjustment mechanism as significant positive developments.

In the final analysis, the challenge with the rating agencies is to maintain APS' investment grade credit rating. The company has computed debt-to-capital and debt coverage ratios resulting from the proposed settlement that appear to support its current BBB rating.

Q. HAS THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT HAD AN IMPACT ON THE PRICE OF PINNACLE WEST STOCK?

In the first two days after the agreement was announced, the stock lost about 3 percent of its market value. That appeared to be a market reaction to the

1	terms of the agreement. If so, I believe it was primarily a selling response
2	from some funds that were expecting, or hoping for, a revenue increase that
3	was closer to the company's original request and that supported its earnings
4	guidance of the past several months.

5 Q. HOW WOULD THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY REACT IF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WERE REJECTED BY THE COMMISSION?

As AUIA said in its rebuttal testimony, the entire financial community has been holding its breath on Pinnacle West, awaiting a favorable outcome in the rate case. Their reviews of the settlement agreement are somewhat mixed, but I think there is no doubt that the financial community would react very negatively if the Commission rejected the settlement or altered it in ways that would reduce the company's earning potential or degrade its credit metrics.

Rate-basing the PWEC Units

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Q. WHAT DOES THE AGREEMENT PROVIDE WITH RESPECT TO THE PWEC GENERATING UNITS?

A. It provides that the five PWEC units, totaling 1,790 MW of generation, will be added to APS' rate base at their December 31, 2004 book value, less a discount of \$148 million to account for the remaining value of the Track B contract between APS and PWEC. The net rate base amount is \$700 million.

20 Q. IS THIS PROVISION CRUCIAL TO THE OVERAL AGREEMENT?

21 A. AUIA believes that it is.

I should point out that the rate-basing provision is inextricably linked to the revenue requirement, the 10-year, self-build moratorium imposed on APS and the requirements for APS to purchase power in the competitive market, including 1,000 MW through an RFP process in 2005. If any of these

provisions were eliminated or altered significantly, it would affect the interests of several parties to the agreement.

In addition, every securities analyst and rating agency that has commented on the proposed settlement has cited the PWEC rate-basing as one of the two most significant issues covered by the agreement.

In today's post-Enron environment, the consensus view in the financial community is that any significant exposure to merchant generation by a regulated utility or its parent company is probably detrimental to its financial profile and its credit standing. The financial community is anxious to see this albatross removed from Pinnacle West/APS.

The Power Supply Adjustor (PSA)

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12 Q. YOU CITED THE PSA AS A KEY ISSUE. WHAT DOES THE 13 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CALL FOR REGARDING A PSA?

A. Without getting mired in detail, the settlement agreement provides that APS shall implement a PSA that covers both fuel and purchased power and also captures the proceeds from market trading. The change in the adjustor is confined to a limited bandwidth. It will be reset annually and there is a mechanism for sharing savings with ratepayers.

19 Q. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PSA?

- A. APS has not had a PSA for a number of years, presumably because its fuel costs stabilized under long-term coal and uranium contracts. Recently, however, conditions have changed in two significant respects.
 - First, APS has developed much more exposure to natural gas as a generation fuel than it had a few years ago, whether as a result of its own decisions to build or as a consequence of its increased reliance on the

wholesale market. The bottom line is that there is nothing out there to meet incremental needs economically other than gas-fueled generation.

Second, the price of natural gas has risen dramatically in recent months -- more than double since 2001 -- and there is no indication that it is going anywhere but up.

Absent a PSA, the company's increased reliance on natural gas puts its cash flows, its earning potential and its credit metrics at risk. That is why virtually every securities and credit rating analyst has rated the PSA as one of the most important provisions in the settlement agreement.

Q. IS THE PSA PROVISION CRUCIAL TO THE SETTLEMENT

11 AGREEMENT?

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A. It is crucial in the sense that it is a major component of the agreement and it is also a critical element in APS' ability to maintain financial integrity going forward. As we noted earlier, the PSA is significant in the investment community's evaluation of the company.

16 Clarification of APS' Obligation to Serve

17 Q. HOW DOES THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CLARIFY APS' 18 OBLIGATIONS?

19 A. My response will be more complicated than the question, but the relevant 20 portions of the agreement are Sections IX and X.

Section X affirms that APS has the continuing obligation to plan for and serve all electric customers in its service area. However, APS is not granted a right to serve that would exclude other lawful providers and its planning must account for the potential impact of direct access programs.

This section also clarifies that APS has the ability to meet its

obligations by self-building or buying new generation assets to serve native load, subject to the conditions of Section IX.

Section IX imposes a 10-year moratorium on the self-build option, with certain exceptions, and requires APS to conduct a competitive procurement by the end of 2005 for at least 1,000 MW of long-term resources. Under the terms of this section, APS is not precluded from negotiating bilateral agreements for generation resources with non-affiliated suppliers.

While some provisions of Section IX may seem to encase APS in an operational straitjacket, the section as a whole has been carefully crafted to give APS and the Commission the flexibility to reach the resource decisions that are in the best interest of APS' customers.

Q. WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT ABOUT THIS CLARIFICATION?

A.

As I noted earlier in my testimony, the language of the Track A and Track B decisions has shrouded in uncertainty the options which APS may pursue in meeting its obligation to serve. Without some clarification, APS faces both regulatory and financial risk for its resource decisions.

The relevant provisions of the settlement agreement clarify the options that are available to APS and lay out the ground rules that APS must follow in pursuing them. In some instances, APS has the burden of justifying a preferred course of action, but in the final analysis, both APS and the Commission retain the ultimate flexibility to determine which resource decisions are appropriate.

Q. ARE THESE PROVISIONS CRITICAL TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT?

25 A. The provisions of Sections IX and X are the result of hard-fought negotiations

and they are linked directly to the PWEC rate-basing provisions. Elimination or significant alteration of these sections would affect the interests of numerous parties. Therefore, I would argue that they are critical to the settlement agreement.

5 IV. Conclusion & Recommendation

A.

Q. WHAT IS AUIA'S RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION

REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT?

This settlement agreement is absolutely unique. Twenty-eight parties were involved in the settlement discussions. Twenty-two have signed the agreement and five of the remaining six don't oppose it. Before the negotiations occurred, I could not have imagined that an agreement involving so many parties representing such diverse interests could actually resolve such a plethora of complex and contentious issues. For that reason alone, I believe the Commission should treat this agreement with respect.

If it is adopted without significant changes, this agreement will allow APS and the Commission to get on with business and shed the legacy of 1999 without further rancorous litigation at this Commission or in the courts. As I noted earlier, the financial community is collectively holding its breath, waiting for an outcome to this case. This agreement will cause them to exhale.

Conversely, if the agreement is rejected or dismembered, it will be perceived that APS is rowing upstream against regulatory uncertainty and financial insecurity and the financial community can be expected to react very negatively.

Nobody likes everything about this agreement, but AUIA believes that

- a careful examination of the proposed settlement will convince the
 Commissioners that the Commission itself and nearly all of the interests that
 are arrayed before it in this proceeding are well served by it. Therefore,
 AUIA urges the Commission to approve the settlement agreement without
 altering its material terms and conditions.
- 6 Q. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?
- 7 A. Yes it does.